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Abstract 
This article explores in detail the legal structures and discursive framings informing the 
governance of one particular ‘backward’ region of India, the Andaman Islands. It traces the 
shifting patterns of occupation and development of the Islands in the colonial and post-colonial 
periods, with a special focus on the changes wrought by independence in 1947 and the eventual 
history of planned development. It demonstrates how intersecting discourses of indigenous 
savagery/primitivism and the geographical emptiness was repeatedly mobilised in colonial era 
surveys and post-colonial policy documents. Post-colonial visions of developing the Andaman 
Islands ushered in a settler-colonial governmentality, infused with genocidal fantasies of the 
‘dying savage’. Laws professing to protect aboriginal Jarawas actually worked to unilaterally 
extend Indian sovereignty over the lands and bodies of a community clearly hostile to such 
incorporation. It questions the current exclusion of India from the global geographies of settler-
colonialism and argues that the violent and continuing history of indigenous marginalisation in 
the Andaman Islands represents a de facto operation of a logic of terra nullius. 
  
                                                          
1 I presented earlier versions of this paper at various venues, including a workshop on ‘Law, 
citizenship and democratic state building in India’, held in SOAS; a conference on ‘Manifestations 
of History in the Andaman Islands’, held at LMU, Munich, and at the Five College History 
Seminar. I am grateful to the organizers of these events, particularly to Frank Heidemann, Philipp 
Zehmisch, Clare Anderson, Eleanor Newbigin and Rohit De, for the opportunity to present work-
in-progress to an informed and engaged audience. I am thankful for all the productive questions 
and comments I received from the participants, particularly from Vishvajit Pandya, Madhusree 
Mukerjee, Pankaj Sekhsaria, Taylor Sherman, William Gould, Rochana Bajpai and Fernando 
Armstrong-Fumero.  
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The Andaman Islands occupy a contradictory place within the national imagination of India. 
Frequently excluded from popular representations of Indian territory, such as weather maps, they 
nevertheless play a key role within nationalist narratives as the feared ‘Kalapani’ (black waters) 
where freedom fighters were banished to a life of exile. In this narrative, which is a gross 
simplification of the complex history of the transportation of convicts to the Andaman Islands that 
began in 1858, the Andaman Islands are refigured as a sacred and redemptive space for Indian 
nationalism.2 Today, there is considerable state investment in propagating a standardised, 
nationalist narrative of Andaman’s past. In 1979, President Morarji Desai declared the ruins of the 
cellular jail at Port Blair to be a national monument, which paved the way for the creation of a 
museum.3 Tourists visiting the Island can enjoy Son-et-Lumieres within the jail compound that 
narrates ‘the saga of the heroic freedom struggle’.4  The official website of the Andaman and 
Nicobar Administration informs us that ‘The patriots who raised their voice against the British Raj 
were sent to this Jail, where many perished. Netaji Subash Chandra Bose hoisted the tri-colour flag 
to proclaim Independence on 30th December 1943 at a place near this Jail.’5 This narrative, despite 
its nationalist trappings, is a coloniser’s history. It reduces Andaman Islands’ past to moments of 
imbrication in the master narrative of the emergence of the Indian nation. The Islands gain 
relevance through the periodic presence of nationalists from mainland India, whether as prisoners 
or as liberators. What it ignores is a complex process of marginalisation of the Islands’ indigenous 
                                                          
2 Aparna Vaidik, Imperial Andamans: Colonial Encounter and Island History (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010).   
3 Sandeep Joshi, ‘A befitting tribute’, The Hindu, March 24, 2012.  
4 ‘National Monument: Cellular Jail’ as advertised in The Official Web Portal, Andaman and 
Nicobar Administration, http://www.and.nic.in/tourism/cjail.php.  
5 Ibid.  
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population, which began with British occupation in the middle of the nineteenth century6 and 
developed into full-blown settler-colonialism after the Islands gained formal independence.  
This article explores this anomalous emergence of settler colonial governmentality within a post-
colony, i.e., India. I argue that this cannot be seen merely as a continuation of colonial policies. 
Colonial epistemology had actively produced the Andaman Islands as ‘no-ones land’ - devoid of 
rule of law, agriculture and any notion of sovereignty or ownership of land. This refusal to 
recognize indigenous rights to land set the Andaman Islands apart from mainland India, where 
customary tribal laws, including customary land rights had been formally recognised since the 
nineteenth century.7 Yet, during the colonial period, there was no systematic attempt to settle the 
Islands. This pattern of governance shifted radically with independence of India. The nationalist 
elite combined inherited colonial discourses, which refused to acknowledge indigenous rights to 
land, with a new post-colonial zeal to transform, through planned development, these ‘backward’ 
Islands.  The result was a state-led project of expansion of agriculture using settlers from the 
mainland of India. It reduced indigenous communities to embattled and endangered minorities, 
‘protected’ in designated ‘reserves’. This article maps this violent history and demonstrates how 
legal regimes promising protection to indigenous communities actually normalised their 
displacement and disenfranchisement.  
                                                          
6 For a history of the penal colony see  Satadru Sen, Disciplining Punishment: Colonialism and 
Convict Society in the Andaman Islands (Oxford University Press, 2000). For broader histories see 
Clare Anderson, Madhumita Mazumdar, and Vishvajit Pandya, New Histories of the Andaman 
Islands: Landscape, Place and Identity in the Bay of Bengal, 1790–2012 (Cambridge University 
Press, 2015), and  Vaidik, Imperial Andamans, (2010). 
7 Nandini Sundar, ‘Laws, Policies and Practices in Jharkhand’, Economic and Political Weekly, 
40: 41, (2005) 4459-4462 and Alf Gubvald Nilsen, ‘Subalterns and the State in the Longue Durée: 
Notes from “The Rebellious Century” in the Bhil Heartland’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 45:4 
(2015), 574-95. 
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I argue that the key to understanding indigenous marginalization in the Andaman Islands is to 
make visible the surreptitious or sly operation of a logic of terra nullius.8 Broadly understood as 
the imperial tendency to treat tribal or indigenous land as ‘no one’s land’, terra nullius has long 
been seen as the defining feature of settler-colonialism in Australia.9 While the actual incidence of 
this legal doctrine in Australian history and its relevance in current jurisprudence is richly debated, 
I suggest a different approach towards understanding the temporal and geographical scope of terra 
nullius through a study if the colonization of Andaman Islands. In the Andamans, the doctrine of 
terra nullius was never operationalized in the sphere of law.10 Instead, it worked powerfully at a 
discursive level, informing policy and structuring patterns of governance. It marked as ‘empty’ 
lands inhabited by indigenous communities. The de facto operation of the doctrine of terra nullius  
not only enabled colonial occupation, but also fostered post-colonial fantasies of rapid 
development of ‘empty’ and ‘backward’ lands. Pradoxically, the discourse of terra nullius gained 
momentum in the post-colonial period. In order to explain this particular trajectory, this article 
begins with an exploration of how the twinned discourses of savagery and emptiness shaped the 
colonial history of the Andaman Islands. It moves on to map changes and continuities in the post-
                                                          
8 For an alternative reading of the Andaman Islands as terra nullius,  see Vishvajit Pandya, ‘In 
Terra Nullius: The Legacies of Science and Colonialism in the Andaman Islands’, paper presented 
at Science Society and Nature, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library Public Lecture Series, 22 
May 2013.  
9 Alan Frost, “New South Wales as Terra nullius: The British Denial of Aboriginal Land Rights,” 
Historical Studies 19 (1981), 513–23 and Stuart Banner,‘Why Terra Nullius? Anthropology and 
Property Law in Early Australia’, Law and History Review, 23: 1 (2005), 95-132.  On the changed 
legal landscape after the landmark Mabo ruling, see Bain Attwood (ed.), In the Age of Mabo: 
History Aborigines and Australia, Allen and Unwin, 1996; and Lisa Strelein, Compromised 
Jurisprudence: Native Title Cases Since Mabo, Aboriginal Studies Press, 2009.  
10 For scholarship privileging the legal aspect of the doctrine of terra nullius in global history, see 
Stuart Banner, Possessing the Pacific Land, Settlers, and Indigenous People from Australia to 
Alaska, (Harvard University Press, 2007) and David Boucher, 'The Law of Nations and the 
Doctrine of Terra Nullius' in Asbach, Olaf, and Peter Schröder. ed. War, the State, and 
International Law in Seventeenth-Century Europe, (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2010).  
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colonial period when discourses of development were grafted on to colonial constructions of 
‘primitive’ tribes to generate a peculiar pattern of settler colonialism that masqueraded as 
development of backward land and protection aboriginal tribes.11  
No-One’s Island: Savagery, Emptiness and Colonisation of the Andaman Islands   
The first occupation of the Andaman Islands dated back to 1789 and lasted less than a decade. 
However, the fascination with ‘savagery’ in the Andaman Islands predated this occupation by the 
English East India Company.12 The Islands entered the annals of European explorers as the wild 
habitat of equally wild anthropophagi. In the earliest accounts, the inhabitants of the Andaman 
Islands were mythical, fantastic creatures, frequently depicted with animal heads and tails.13 In the 
late eighteenth century, with the Indian Ocean increasingly becoming a British sea, the Andaman 
Islands were mapped into imperial geographies of domination. A series of surveys and reports 
paved the way for actual occupation. The survey reports prepared by Ritchie, Alexander Kyd and 
Archibald Blair14 in the last decades of the eighteenth century definitely established the inhabitants 
                                                          
11 There is a growing body of scholarship mapping the transition from colony to nation-state in 
India. Both the nationalist assertion of liberation, and the postcolonial critique of the nation-state 
as a neo-colonial entity have given way to more careful studies of the specificities of the 
transformation of patterns of governance. For examples, see Rajnarayan Chandavarkar,. “Customs 
of Governance: Colonialism and Democracy in Twentieth Century India.” Modern Asian Studies 
41:3 (2007): 441–70; Taylor C.  Sherman, William Gould, and Sarah Ansari. From Subjects to 
Citizens, (Cambridge University Press, 2014) and Stuart Corbridge, Glyn Williams, Manoj 
Srivastava, and René Véron, Seeing the State: Governance and Governmentality in India, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
12 Sen, Savagery and Colonialism, p. 2.  
13 For a details of these divergent accounts see M.V. Portman’s A History of Our Relations with 
the Andamanese, (Calcutta, 1899).  
14 Ritchie’s Survey of the Andaman Islands, 1771, Alexander Kyd, Report to the Government of 
India, Minutes of the Governor General, 1792 and Archibald Blair, Survey of the Andamans, 1793. 
In this paper I have largely used the liberal extracts from these reports republished in M.V. 
Portman’s History of Our Relations with the Andamanese.  
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of the Islands to be humans, albeit savages. These reports were steeped in Enlightenment notions 
of savagery and property, especially Lockian ideas of ownership of land through improvement.  
Kyd contended that in their manners, the ‘savages’ of the Andaman Islands ranked amongst the 
‘lowest yet discovered on the scale of civilization, in a word Man in the rudest state of nature’.15 
Their ‘degraded’ state was linked to the tropical climate of the Islands, which sustained a 
rudimentary life devoid of clothing or shelter. ‘Ignorant in the arts of husbandry and cultivation, 
they derive their subsistence from the spontaneous productions of the earth…’16 Kyd’s description 
was steeped in a conjectural notion of history, in which cultivation of land represented the first 
‘stage’ of civilization.17 The aboriginal inhabitants of the Islands were marked as particularly 
backward, even amongst ‘primitive’ tribes encountered by colonial explorers, as they did not 
cultivate land. This particular lack could pave the way for the denial of indigenous right to land. 
In Enlightenment thought, ownership of land was linked to man’s ability to ‘improve it for the 
benefit of Life’.18 For Locke, the injunction to improve land was a divine one, and ‘He that in 
obedience of this Command of God, subdued, tilled and sowed any part of it thereby annexed to it 
something that was his Property’.19 Following this logic, it could be argued that the Andaman 
Islands belonged to nobody, i.e., was terra nullius and was open to occupation and improvement 
by the British. This was the implicit logic that rationalised the occupation of the Andaman Islands 
by the English East India Company in 1789.   
                                                          
15 Alexander Kyd, Report to the Government of India, 1792, cited in Portman, Relations with the 
Andamanese,1899, p. 93.  
16 Ibid, p. 94.  
17 H.M. Hopfl, “Savage to Scotsman: Conjectural History in the Scottish Enlightenment,” The 
Journal of British Studies, 17:2, 1978, 19-40. 
18 John Locke, Two Treatises on Government, 1690, republished Cambridge University Press, 
1970. 
19 Ibid. 
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The East India Company mainly wanted to create a naval harbour and were not particularly 
interested in building settlements.20 Nevertheless, Lieutenant Blair, who led this expedition, was 
given explicit instructions to obtain the consent of the local inhabitants.21  It is evident from Blair’s 
notes that despite frequent encounters with the indigenous population, ranging from friendly 
attempts at conversations to violent skirmishes, he never attempted to obtain consent for 
settlement. The colonisers not only occupied and cleared Chatham Island, which was the chosen 
site for the harbour, but also claimed and cleared a strip of forested land around Phoenix Bay, in 
South Andaman Island. A newly built road stood in for the unilaterally imposed frontier between 
‘native’ and East India Company territory; and the superior firepower of muskets and the ship’s 
guns stood in for indigenous consent. By March 1792, Blair had the satisfaction of commenting 
on how the ‘natives have been perfectly inoffensive for a long time’.22 A similar pattern of 
occupation was repeated in Port Cornwallis, where the settlement was shifted after 1792. This 
settlement was abandoned in 1796, partly on account of ill-health amongst the settlers, and partly 
because it had outlived its utility as a safe harbour.23 However, it set the precedence of laying claim 
to the Andaman Islands without any need to acknowledge indigenous sovereignty or property 
rights. It is likely that this de facto practice of terra nullius was enabled by the assertion that the 
indigenous inhabitants of the Andamans, much like the population Cook encountered in New 
South Wales, represented men in the lowest rung in the ladder of civilization.24    
                                                          
20  Portman, Relations with the Andamanese, 1899, pp. 80-84.  
21 India Board to Governor General and Council at Bengal, 9 April 1785, PRO FO 41/1, cited in 
Merete Borch, “Rethinking the Origins of Terra Nullius,” Australian Historical Studies. 32:117, 
2001. 
22 Portman, Relations with the Andamanese, 1899, p. 84. 
23 For details see Vaidik, Imperial Andamans, 2010.  
24 Banner, ‘Why Terra Nullius?’ pp. 105-10.  
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The second attempt to occupy the Andaman Islands, launched in 1858, also derived from the 
imperial and strategic needs of the British Empire. However, the rebellion of 1857 sealed the fate 
of the Islands as a penal colony, designed to house a burgeoning population of convicts from the 
Indian mainland. The occupation was preceded by a survey conducted by a committee of experts, 
consisting of Dr. F.J.Mouat, Dr. G.R. Playfair and Lt. J.S. Heathcoat, which was followed by 
Mouat’s reports on the Andamans.25 Once more, the savagery of the Andaman Islanders was 
mobilised to justify occupation. Mouat’s report chronicled, in some detail, all existing reports of 
occasional shipwrecks in the Andaman Islands, which were ‘accompanied by circumstances of 
unusual barbarity’.26 He presents this largely as an explanation of what prompted the second 
occupation of the Andaman Islands. However, for Mouat, the proof of the ‘savagery’ of the 
inhabitants of the Andaman Islands did not derive from their hostility towards shipwrecks alone. 
To him, they were one of ‘the most savage races on the face of the earth, whom civilization has 
yet found it impossible to tame, or even almost to approach.’27  They acknowledged ‘no law to 
restrain and guide them’ and had no knowledge of ‘a supreme Being’ or agriculture.28 In other 
words, since the inhabitants of the Andamans lacked a form of political or social organization 
recognisable to Eurocentric frameworks, colonial surveys represented the islands as a land devoid 
of law. This made British occupation not just desirable, but almost inevitable, given the proximity 
of the Andaman Islands to vital trading routes.  
The second British occupation of the Andaman Islands did not explicitly evoke the doctrine of 
terra nullius; nor did it profess any explicit intent of settling the Islands. Yet, the discursive 
                                                          
25 Frederic J. Mouat, Adventures and Researches among the Andaman Islanders (London, 1863).  
26 Mouat, Andaman Islanders, p. 39.  
27 Ibid, p. 3-4. 
28 Ibid, p. 2. 
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emptying out of the Andaman Islands - of law, religion and social and economic organization - 
preceded its occupation. Unlike mainland India, no treaties of conquest were ever signed in the 
Andaman Islands. Neither was land purchased from ‘natives’, as was common practice in North 
America. Yet, as the penal colony expanded, so did the piecemeal settlements of land, driven by 
convicts and ex-convicts. This dynamic can be characterized as the de facto operation of the 
colonizing logic of terra nullius.  
In sum, the history of colonial occupations of the Andaman Islands followed a pattern where actual 
occupation was preceded by a flurry of reports and surveys that argued for the exceptionally 
primitive nature of the indigenous population of the Islands. This discourse of savagery and 
emptiness enabled the creeping appropriation of indigenous land in and around the expanding 
penal settlement of Port Blair. However, the actual pace and scale of agricultural colonisation was 
severely constrained by the remote location of the Islands and the difficulty of recruiting willing 
settlers. The full potential of the logic of terra nullius in facilitating indigenous dispossession was 
realized only in the post-colonial period. Far from posing incommensurability with democratic 
self-rule, colonial discourses around savagery and emptiness proved to be amenable to re-
articulations within a self-consciously nationalist context. Accompanying this re-articulation were 
a series of new policies. These policies claimed to develop the Andaman Islands and protect its 
aboriginal population, but actually served to entrench a settler-colonial governmentality.29 
Expanding Settlements and ‘Dying’ aboriginals: Development in the Andamans  
                                                          
29 Michel Foucault, ‘Governmentality’, Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds.), 
The Foucault effect, studies in governmentality, (University of Chicago, 1991), pp. 87-104. 
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With the transfer of power, little changed in the administrative structure of the Andaman and 
Nicobar Islands. As a type D province, the Islands continued to be directly ruled by Delhi through 
a Chief Commissioner selected from the ranks of the erstwhile Indian Civil Service, now renamed 
the Indian Administrative Service. The only difference was that the Chief Commissioner was now 
appointed by the President of India, instead of the British Viceroy, and reported to the Ministry of 
Home Affairs. In the absence of a local legislative body, he was the highest judicial and executive 
authority in the Islands, while the President was empowered to provide regulations for governance, 
which would have the same force as an Act of Parliament.30 Picking up exactly where the British 
government had left off, the government of India imagined the Andaman Islands in terms of 
multiple lacks. It was seen as backward, under-populated and under-developed. This apparent 
continuity in governmental structures and attitudes was disrupted by a heightened nationalist 
awareness. The government in Delhi was determined to outdo its colonial predecessor in 
developing the Islands and in integrating it, socially and politically, to the Indian mainland. The 
latter goal had never been entertained by the British administration of the Andaman Islands. 
Development has also been conceived narrowly. The colonial administration had concentrated on 
extracting and profiting from the Island’s natural resources, particularly, timber. With 
independence, the Andaman Islands began to be mapped into an emerging geography of national 
planning. The post-colonial state distinguished itself from its colonial predecessor by seeing itself 
as the harbinger of comprehensive economic and social development.31 The Andaman Islands, 
                                                          
30 For details see R. V. R. Murthy, Andaman and Nicobar Islands: Development and 
Decentralization, (Mittal Publications, 2005). 
31 Partha Chattterjee, ‘Development Planning and the Indian State’ in Terence J Byres ed. The 
State and Development Planning in India, (Oxford University Press, 1994). For debates on the 
meanings and processes of post-colonial development in India see Pranab Bardhan, The Political 
Economy of Development in India, (Oxford University Press, 1991), Chakravarthy, Sukhamoy. 
Development planning: The Indian experience. (Oxford University Press, 1987) and  Benjamin 
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being a directly administered territory, felt the full force of the developmental state. The new rulers 
of the Islands were quick to envision comprehensive plans of expanding agriculture, a rapid 
increase in population and ambitious projects of achieving self-sufficiency in food.32 All of these 
schemes were designed to be driven forward by settlers from the mainland of India. In other words, 
national development arrived in the Andaman Islands as an out and out colonising discourse that 
sought to radically transform the entire Islands. This vision reduced the indigenous population of 
the Andaman Islands to impediments in the path of the juggernaut of planned development.  
This framing of indigenous islanders as problems for the administration was not new. Through 
much of the colonial period, the Anadamanese Islanders had been subjected to a two-pronged 
policy, which sought to discipline and civilize the ‘friendly’ aboriginal while punishing the 
‘hostile’ ones through punitive expeditions. The combined onslaught of displacement and 
epidemics had decimated the population of the Great Andamanese tribes and thrust them into 
irreversible decline, thus creating yet another type – the ‘dying savage’.33 It is this complex 
conglomeration of ‘hostile’, ‘friendly’ and ‘dying’ aboriginals that the Government of India took 
over in 1947. Officially recognised as aboriginal tribes in the 1950s, they were reclassified as 
primitive tribal groups or PTGs in the 1970s.34 This period of official recognition was also the 
                                                          
Zachariah, Developing India: An Intellectual and Social History, C. 1930-50, (Oxford University 
Press, 2005).     
32 The planned increase in the population of the Andaman Islands is discussed in details below. 
For a discussion of how agricultural colonisation in the Andaman Islands gained momentum and 
funds from India’s Grow More Food campaigns, see Uditi Sen, Refugees and the Politics of Nation 
Building in India, 1947- 1971, Unpublished Thesis, Cambridge University, 2009.  
33 Through the accounts and actions of M.V. Portman, the mid-nineteenth century romantic trope 
of the dying or vanishing savage and its concomitant practice of salvage anthropology came to be 
a dominant trope in the Andaman Islands. For details see Sen, Savagery and Colonialism. 
34 Any tribal group displaying any one of the following features - low and declining population, 
pre-agricultural technology and very low literacy rates - was characterised as a Primitive Tribal 
Groups or PTG. For details see Sarit Kumar Chaudhuri and Sucheta Sen Chaudhuri (eds.) 
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period when the authorities in Delhi set out to transform these ‘backwards’ Islands through planned 
development, leading to a precipitous decline in the space afforded to indigenous life.  
When Indian authorities took over the administration of the Andaman Islands, its indigenous 
population consisted of four distinct groups- the Great Andamanese, the Jarawas, the Onges and 
the Sentinelese. Each of these ‘tribes’ were products of histories of pacification and of colonial 
ethnography, albeit in different ways.35 The ‘friendly’ Great Andamanese who lived around the 
settlement of Port Blair were a conglomeration of the survivors of the ten tribes that had once 
inhabited the Great Andamans archipelago. The Onges, of Little Andaman Island and the Jarawas 
who inhabited the western regions of South and Middle Andaman Islands had both been treated as 
a threat and subjected to years of expeditions designed to ‘tame’ them. While the Onges had been 
declared to be ‘tamed’ by 1885 and thus appeared as a ‘friendly’ tribe in 1947, the Jarawas 
remained ‘hostile’ and unapproachable.36 The Sentinelese, who live on the North Sentinel Island, 
have been largely spared incursions of outsiders due to their distant location. The Jarawas, by 
contrast, bore the brunt of punitive British expeditions that began in the 1860s. The inter-war years 
witnessed significant expansion of forestry and the penal settlement in the South and Middle 
Andamans. This led to a rise in violent encounters between the Jarawas and settlers and punitive 
                                                          
Primitive Tribes in Contemporary India: Concept, Ethnography and Demography, (Mittal 
Publications, 2005).  
35 In the Indian context, the parameters of what constituted a tribe, as opposed to a caste, emerged 
out of colonial ethnography and remained notoriously vague. See Andre Beteille, ‘The Concept of 
Tribe with Special Reference to India', European Journal of Sociology, 27:2, 1986; 
36 Several scholars have explored the complicity between colonial knowledge production and the 
domination of the aboriginal tribes of Andaman Islands. For the Jarawas, see Vishvajit Pandya, 
‘Jarwas of Andaman Islands: Their Social and Historical Reconstruction’, Economic and Political 
Weekly, 37:37, 3830-34. For the Onges, see Sita Venkateswar, Development and Ethnocide: 
Colonial Practices in the Andaman Islands, (Copenhagen, 2004) and for the Great Andamanese 
and Jarawas see Sen, Savagery and Colonialism and Pandya, ‘In Terra Nullius’. 
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expeditions against the former.37 Nationalist planners inherited this colonial ‘problem’ of the 
‘hostile’ Jarawas.  
While the new rulers of the Andaman Islands were determined to develop and colonise it, they lost 
the primary means of doing so: unfree convict labour.38 Preliminary surveys concluded that 
‘extensive colonisation is not only possible but desirable to make the islands self-supporting in 
food and labour requirements. It will only be with an increased population and increased 
communications that the resources (including forests) of these islands can be exploited fully in the 
interests of the country as a whole.’39 However, the administration struggled to find settlers willing 
to travel to the dreaded and isolated Kalapani. A solution was found by exploiting India’s post-
partition refugee crisis to provide settlers for the Andaman Islands. In the aftermath of partition, 
thousands of unwanted refugees from East Pakistan languished in camps strewn across West 
Bengal. Unlike their Punjabi counterparts, the displaced Bengalis had no hope of obtaining land 
or monetary compensation.40 Unsurprisingly, the national government found ‘willing’ settlers for 
the Andaman Islands in these overcrowded and disease-ridden camps, with the enthusiastic help 
of the Government of West Bengal.41 Between April 1949 and August 1951, the Ministry of Home 
                                                          
37 K. Mukhopadhay, P.K. Bhattacharya and B.N. Sarkar (eds.) Jarawa contact: Ours with them, 
theirs with us, (Calcutta, 2002). 
38 For Andaman administrations reliance of convict labour, see Aparna Vaidik, ‘Working the 
Islands: Labour Regime in Colonial Andamans (1858-1921)’ in Marcel van der Linden and 
Prabhu Mohapatra (eds.) Towards global history: New comparisons, ( New Delhi, 2008), pp. 
189-253. 
39 H.R. Shivdasani, Report on the possibilities of colonization and development of the Andaman 
and Nicobar Islands, (New Delhi, 1949), henceforth, Shivdasani Report.  
40 For the specificities of the refugee experience in the East, see Joya Chatterji, The spoils of 
partition: Bengal and India, 1947-67, (Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
41 Sabyasachi Basu Roy Chowdhury, ‘Exiled to the Andamans: The refugees from East Pakistan’ 
in Pradip Kumar Bose (ed.) Refugees in West Bengal: Institutional processes and contested 
identities, (Calcutta, 2000, pp. 106 – 41) and Uditi Sen, Refugees and the Politics of Nation 
Building in India, 1947- 1971, Unpublished Thesis, Cambridge University, 2009. 
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Affairs sanctioned five separate schemes of resettling displaced families in the Andamans.42 In 
1952, these gave way to an integrated ‘Colonisation and Development Plan’, which constituted 
the core of the first and second five year plans for the Andaman Islands. In this decade, over 3,000 
refugee families were resettled in the Andaman Islands.43 This small fraction of the estimated six 
to eight million refugees who sought shelter in West Bengal. However, for the Andaman Islands, 
the consequences were far-reaching. Its population more than doubled - from 18,962 in 1951 to 
48,985 in 1961.44 Thus, in a decade of independent rule, the scale of colonisation of the Andaman 
Islands dwarfed what British rule had achieved in nearly a century. This state-led demographic 
onslaught was continued in subsequent decades, through an ‘Accelerated Development 
Programme’ that began in 1964. The patterns of development of the Andaman Islands were guided 
by two major reports commissioned by the Government of India, in 1949 and 1965 respectively. 
A closer look at these reports reveals that the decline and disappearance of the aboriginal 
communities of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands was not an unforeseen consequence of 
developmental projects. In fact, the discourse of development in the Andaman Islands presupposed 
the eventual disappearance of the indigenous population.  
Growth Rate of Population in the Andaman District of Andaman and Nicobar Islands 
Census Year Population Percentage of Decadal Growth Rate 
1901 18138 - 
1911 17641 (-) 2.74 
                                                          
42 File No. 8/8/53-AN, Ministry of Home Affairs, Andamans Branch, 1953, National Archives of 
India, New Delhi.  
43 Sen, Refugees and the Politics of Nation Building in India, 2009. 
44 Figures taken from Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Andaman and Nicobar 
Administration, Economic Survey of Andaman and Nicobar Islands, 2007-2008, 2008.  
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1921 17814 0.98 
1931 19223 7.91 
1941 21316 10.89 
1951 18962 (-) 11.04 
1961 48985 158.33 
1971 93468 90.81 
1981 158287 69.35 
1991 241453 52.54 
2001 314084 30.38 
 
Source: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Andaman and Nicobar Administration, 
Economic Survey of Andaman and Nicobar Islands, 2007-2008, December 2008. 
 
The Report on the Possibilities of Colonization and Development of the Andaman and Nicobar 
Islands (1949) was produced by a team of bureaucrats drawn from the Forest, Agricultural, Public 
Works and Home Affairs departments of the central Government. Though the team was 
theoretically meant to explore whether colonisation of the Andamans group was desirable or not, 
in effect, the eventual colonisation of the Islands using refugees from East Bengal was already a 
settled fact.45 This is evident from the questions this survey team was expected to answer. The 
team left Delhi with detailed questionnaires prepared by the Ministry of Home Affairs. 
Questionnaire I consisted of twenty eight separate questions, that prompted the team to comment 
on diverse means of developing the Islands that included building a dry dock, developing sugar-
                                                          
45 Colonisation, in this context, means agricultural expansion carried out under the aegis of the 
state through the establishment of new villages. See B.H. Farmer, Agricultural colonization in 
India since independence, London, 1974. 
16 
 
cane plantations, developing tourism and settling refugees in the Islands. Tellingly, question 
number twenty seven, ‘What are the possibilities of settling refugees in the islands?’ had an entire 
supplementary questionnaire attached to it that raised detailed queries on every aspect of the future 
resettlement of refugees in the Andaman Islands. The ‘aborigines’ featured in only two questions 
in the first questionnaire, which asked for information regarding the areas occupied by them and 
possible means their ‘protection and welfare’.46 The author of the report, H.R. Shivdasani, chose 
to respond to issues of land occupation alone and was silent on questions of welfare.  
The team was unable to visit the Nicobar Islands and recommended that it be left out of 
colonisation projects for the time being, since the resident population of Nicobarese, though found 
to be a ‘peaceful and simple race’ and ‘primitive in their beliefs’ were by no means ‘jungli’ (wild) 
or ‘dying out’.47 The word ‘jungli’ evokes not just savagery or wildness, but also the fact of living 
in a jungle and relying on hunting as a primary means of subsistence.48 Thus, the evolutionary 
schema of colonial anthropology, which read lack of agriculture as evidence of primitivism, 
continued to play a critical role within post-colonial administrative discourse. If not being jungli 
could exempt indigenous groups from colonisation, then being perceived as jungli could, and as 
we will see in the case of the Jarawas and Onges, did enable the appropriation of indigenous land. 
The logic of terra nullius, that linked together the absence of agricultural practices not only with 
savagery, but also with lack of any recognisable rights to land, had lost none of its force in the 
post-colonial period. Shivdasani divided the aboriginal population of the Andaman Islands into 
the ‘friendly’ Great Andamanese, who were ‘definitely dying out rapidly’ and the wild or hostile 
                                                          
46 Shivdasani Report, 1949, Appendix I, Questionnaires A and B.  
47 Shivdasani Report, 1949, p. 2. 
48 Ajay Skaria, “Shades of Wildness Tribe, Caste, and Gender in Western India,” The Journal of 
Asian Studies, 56: 3 (1997): 726–45.  
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tribes, namely, the Onges of Little Andamans, the Sentinelese of North Sentinel Islands and the 
Jarawas of the of the unexplored Western coast forest of the Great Andamans. The report 
recommended that the areas already thought to be occupied by aboriginals be left out of schemes 
of colonisation. There was as yet no proposal to set up a formal reservation for the Jarawas. 
However, Shivdasani’s Report in many ways anticipated the later carving out of a bounded space 
as the Jarawa Reserve by arguing that the indigenous population was ‘confined to specified 
areas’.49 It reframed the territory of the Andaman Islands within a binary framework that consisted 
of two kinds of lands – specific territories that needed to be reserved for the indigenous population, 
i.e., not encroached upon, and everywhere else, where no such consideration was necessary. This 
was, however, a temporary reprieve based on inadequate information and did not amount to any 
acknowledgement of indigenous right to land. It envisioned that the area reserved for the Jarawas 
could be ‘decreased in course of time after better contact has been made with them and their proper 
number ascertained’.50 The unstated assumption here is that the Jarawas, in 1949, occupied more 
land than they needed. This is a familiar settler-colonial logic, resonating with eighteenth century 
justifications of the colonisation of North America, where the Indians were seen to occupy more 
land than they needed, thus justifying the colonial ‘restriction’ of ‘savages within narrower 
bounds’ and occupation of part of their territory.51 Much like the eighteenth-century jurists, 
Shivdasani’s report apparently expressed a case for co-existence of settlers and indigenous people. 
However, by arguing that the amount of territory to be reserved for the Jarawas was to be 
determined by their numbers alone, the report advocated a pattern of development in which the 
                                                          
49 Shivdasani Report, 1949, p. 3.  
50 Shivdasani Report, p. 5.  
51 Emer de Vattel, (new edition by Joseph Chitty and Edward D. Ingrahm), Principles of the law 
of nature applied to the conduct and affairs of nations and sovereigns, (T & J.W. Johnson, 
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very survival of the Jarawas was pitted against the hunger for more land amongst settlers.  What 
Shivdasani’s report envisioned was not just a one-off plan of colonisation of uninhabited lands in 
the Andamans, but a profound re-imagination of the entire territory of the Andaman and Nicobar 
Islands as national lands, and therefore, lands awaiting development. In recommending that 
colonisation should be, in the preliminary stages, confined to uninhabitated stretches of South, 
Middle and North Andaman Islands, Shivdasani attached the caveat that ‘the rest of the Islands 
can be tackled later’.52 Thus, independence unleashed in the Andaman Islands a logic of 
development that needed indigenous land, but had no use for indigenous people. Henceforth, all 
that Andaman’s aboriginal tribes had to do to get in the way of developmental projects was to stay 
at home and continue a pattern of subsistence that relied on access to land and its resources. Thus, 
a settler-colonial ‘logic of elimination’53 arrived in the Andaman Islands masquerading as national 
development.  
The 1960s saw a renewed emphasis on the colonisation of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, 
which was linked to a renewed refugee crisis. In 1964, when the Indian Ministry of Rehabilitation 
was reconstituted, it was also made responsible for development of ‘such special areas as may be 
indicated by the Prime Minister from time to time.’54  These ‘special areas’ were defined as those 
areas of the country where for climactic, geographical or other reasons, economic and social 
development has been retarded55 and which, though sparsely populated, are richly endowed with 
                                                          
52 Shivdasani Report, 1949, p. 5.  
53 Patrick Wolfe. ‘Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native’, Journal of Genocide 
Research, Volume 8, Issue 4, 2006, pp. 387–409.  
54 Inter-Departmental Team on Accelerated Development Programme for Andaman and Nicobar 
Islands, Ministry of Rehabilitation, Government of India, Report by the Inter-Departmental 
Team on accelerated development programme for Andaman and Nicobar Islands, (Delhi, 1966), 
p. 1. Henceforth, Report by the Inter-Departmental Team.  
55 Italics mine. 
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natural resources. The first ‘special area’ to be notified was the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The 
attribute of ‘backwardness’ that had originally been attributed to the people inhabiting the 
Andaman Islands was now shifted to describe the land itself. The Islands, already geographically 
remote, were now marked as temporally out of sync with the rest of India. They were perceived as 
lagging behind in the telos of national development and this state of affairs was pathologised using 
medical language. By the 1960s the Andaman Islands was no longer a remedial space where the 
sections of society marked as refuse or waste, such as convicts and refugees, could be recycled. 
The space itself was now marked as retarded and in need of active intervention. The project of 
‘development’ of the Andaman Islands thus shifted from an instrumental use of its perceived 
emptiness to a desire to reconfigure the space entirely, in the image of the Indian mainland.   
The report prepared by an inter-departmental team in 1965 visualised manpower to be the starting 
point of all development. It argued that the Andaman and Nicobar Islands were under-populated 
as its estimated population density was 22.5 per square mile, against the all-India average of 392. 
Based on high annual rainfall and the presence of thick tropical forests, the Andaman Islands were 
deemed to be suitable for agriculture. The report declared that ‘land if properly and fully exploited 
can support a much larger population’.56 It proceeded to set ambitious targets of rapid colonisation 
that envisioned doubling the population in five years and raising the total population to 250,000 
by 1979. The future development of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands was to be ‘so designed as 
to generate employment adequate to support this additional population.’57 In other words, post-
colonial development of the Andaman Islands envisioned settlers from the mainland as both the 
agents and beneficiaries of development. Indigenous communities had no active role within this 
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future-oriented discourse. But neither could they be left alone. The burgeoning population of 
settlers needed land and much of the land deemed suitable for settlement had been classified as 
tribal reserves in 1957.58 This did not deter the inter-departmental team from advocating settlement 
in these areas. The list of areas deemed to be suitable for rapid reclamation as plantations or paddy 
fields included six thousand acres in Rutland Island, sixty thousand acres in the Little Andaman 
Island, ten thousand acres in the middle of Katchal Island, and the entire Great Nicobar Island.59 
All of these areas had been classified as tribal reserves in 1957.60 It also recommended the 
colonisation of three thousand acres in the Betapur catchment area of Middle Andamans. It is 
unclear whether this constituted an incursion into the Jarawa Reserves in Middle Andaman Islands 
or expansion of settlement in contiguous areas. In either case, it would undoubtedly increase the 
zone of contact and conflict between settlers and Jarawas. Unsurprisingly, the report also 
advocated a complete overhaul of the existing policy towards the indigenous population of the 
Andaman Islands. It argued that government policy of interfering as little as possible with the way 
of life of the tribal population, in the hope that their adjustment to the changing world might be 
gradual, had failed to achieve results. The inter-departmental team argued that a ‘drastic 
reconsideration’ of government policy was essential. It argued that if continued, the current policy 
was ‘likely to achieve the gradual extinction of these people’.61 Strangely, the report remained 
                                                          
58 This was achieved through the Andaman and Nicobar Protection of Aboriginal Tribes 
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59 Report by the Inter-Departmental Team, 1966, p. 19-20. 
60 Office of the Chief Commissioner Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Extraordinary Notice No. 
ANPATR/3(1)/1 in The Andaman and Nicobar Gazette, Port Blair, 1957, republished in 
‘Annexure I: Anadaman and and Nicobar Protection of Aboriginal Tribes Regulation (ANPATR) 
1956 including all amendments until 2004’ of Pankaj Sekhsaria and Vishvajit Pandya (eds.), The 
Jarawa Tribal Reserve Dossier: Cultural & Biological Diversities in the Andaman Islands, Paris, 
UNESCO, 2010. Henceforth, Jarawa Dossier. 
61 Report by the Inter-Departmental Team, 1966, p. 25. 
21 
 
silent on the Andaman and Nicobar Protection of Aboriginal Tribes Regulation of 1956, despite 
blatantly ignoring provisions made by it.  
This concern for the survival of indigenous communities seems disingenuous as in effect, the 
report recommended an onslaught on indigenous land, particularly the land occupied by Onges in 
Little Andaman Island, the Nicobarese in Katchal Island and the Shompens in Great Nicobar 
Island. In recommending the massive reduction of indigenous access to land and the rapid influx 
of settlers, the team, which lacked any anthropologists, chose to ignore all existing evidence 
pointing to the detrimental impact of loss of land and of presence of outsiders upon indigenous 
communities. Echoing the 1949 report, the section dealing with policy towards aboriginals 
mobilised entrenched tropes of primitivism to completely devalue indigenous life. For example, 
the team declared that it was ‘difficult to conceive of a more primitive way of life’ than that of the 
Onges, since they were ‘quite naked, ’ spent their life in ‘hunting pigs, catching fish in primitive 
canoes and eating roots’ and were ‘incapable of hard work’. However, unlike Shivdasani’s report, 
the later document represents both the ‘friendly’ Onges and the ‘hostile’ Jarawa as dying out. 
According to this report, while the precipitous decline in numbers of the Great Andamanese could 
be attributed to ‘contact with the unsympathetic early colonists’ the Onge were rapidly becoming 
extinct despite being ‘practically isolated from the rest of the population.’62 The isolation of the 
Onge claimed by this report had no basis in facts. The postcolonial government had continued the 
British policy of encouraging the Onge to visit Port Blair and call upon the Chief Commissioner, 
in return for gifts of tobacco, tea and sugar.63 Nevertheless, the Inter-departmental team not only 
attributed the impending extinction of the Onge to the supposed policy of non-intervention adopted 
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towards them, but also declared that it was ‘too late’ to stop their inevitable extinction.64 By 
contrast, the possibility of the Jarawas ‘dying out’ was represented as a tragedy and not yet an 
inevitability. However, if the delegation of the Onges to the scrap-heap of history seemed 
premature, the speculation regarding the extinction of the Jarawas defied explanation. While the 
report lamented the continuing hostility of the Jarawas, it imagined them as a ‘spirited’ people 
with a strong presence. Half of Middle Andamans was ‘infested’ by them, while the expansion of 
colonisation and road construction into the forests had created a situation where ‘friction has 
become more frequent and no month passes without a case of attack’.65 This is hardly the image 
of a people in irreversible decline. Yet, the planners of Andaman’s future were already 
contemplating what a tragedy it would be ‘if they have to die out’. By contrast, the inter-
departmental team advocated that the Sentinelese could be left in isolation for another generation, 
since the Island they occupied was ‘small and far away from the existing colonies’.66 Despite being 
the most isolated of all the Andamanese people, the report neither recommended intervention, nor 
predicted decline and extinction for the Sentinelese people. Reading between the lines of this 
report, it is easy to ascertain the actual reasons for the refusal to leave the Onges and the Jarawas 
alone – they occupied large areas deemed fit for colonisation.  
Thus, within two decades of independence, imminent or eventual extinction had become the 
generalised fate of the indigenous people of the Andaman Islands within bureaucratic imagination. 
It would be more accurate to read this concern regarding the possibility of Onges and Jarawas 
‘dying out’ as a settler-colonial desire for the ideal conditions enabling further development of the 
Andaman Islands. Within the biopolitics of settler-led development of the Andamans, the 
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management of territory in general and tribal lands in particular had become inextricably linked to 
population, in ways which evoked the notion of living space or lebensraum. This was especially 
relevant in 1960s India, where overpopulation was privileged as the most intractable problem for 
economic growth or development.67 According to the 1966 report, while unutilised manpower was 
the nightmare of planners in the mainland, in the Andaman Islands, planners faced the reverse 
problem of scarcity of labour. The planners saw the Andamans as a vast reserve of under-utilised 
land that could provide an outlet for land-hungry agriculturists from mainland India. Within this 
context, to raise fears of the extinction of a tribal population actually provided the justification for 
their displacement, on the grounds that they no longer needed the land reserved for them. In this 
sense, the 1966 report was the logical extension of Shivdasani’s report, despite their radically 
different policy recommendations when it came to land inhabited by aboriginal groups. For the 
Onge, being labelled as group that was ‘rapidly becoming extinct,’ opened the floodgates for a 
series of policies that cleared forests and resettled refugees from East Pakistan in Little Andaman 
Island. Sita Venkateswar has described this systematic marginalising the Onge, which led to their 
eventual resettlement and decline in numbers, as ethnocide.68 Thus, for administrators determined 
to ‘fully exploit’ the land of the Andaman Islands, the ideal aboriginal was the dying aboriginal.  
The desirability of the dying aboriginal, over and above the ‘friendly’ one drew upon the legacy 
of colonial attempts to engage the Great Andamanese in productive labour that had established the 
vulnerability of the ‘savage’ body to external contact as well as their unsuitability to modern 
regimes of productive labour.69 Thus, even when administrators encountered a growing population 
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of aboriginals, as in the case of the Nicobarese, and could admit their need for more living space, 
they were loath to allot land deemed suitable for other productive economic activity, such as 
plantations, to aboriginals. A plan to establish a plantation in Katchal Island, using migrant Tamil 
labour was pushed forward despite full knowledge of the fact that the Nicobarese would view a 
settlement of outsiders as an unwarranted incursion into their domain. Even the local 
administration advised against any colonisation by outsiders, instead arguing that Nicobarese from 
Car Nicobar Island should be allowed to settle there. The planners from Delhi conceded that the 
density of population amongst Nicobarese in Car Nicobar Island was indeed high, and readily 
admitted that the ‘Car Nicobarese do need “lebensraum” for their growing needs’70. Yet, they 
pushed forward with the plans of building a plantation at Katchal.  
The above example, though not directly dealing with the Andaman Islands, illustrates the nature 
of the marginalisation of indigenous communities of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Their 
exclusion from projects of development did not derive from any specific attributes, such as 
declining numbers. Perceived as ‘primitive’ and relics of a past era, indigenous life and culture 
was by definition at odds with future-oriented plans of development that increasingly sought to 
expand forestry, agriculture and plantations into lands deemed to be under-used. Unlike the 
colonial era, there were no punitive campaigns launched against ‘hostile’ Jarawas. Yet the post-
colonial state’s hunger for converting more and more land into productive economic activity that 
excluded ‘primtive’ tribes could not but threaten them, as access to land and its resources is the 
first and most basic premise for indigenous survival. Thus, embedded within post-colonial 
discourses of development we encounter a settler-colonialism that does not use racial difference 
as its organising principle, but is no less motivated by the desire to acquire and transform 
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indigenous land while excluding the people. In other words, development in the Andaman Islands 
was driven by what Wolfe has characterised as the settler-colonial ‘logic of elimination’.71 Within 
an independent and formally democratic polity that is invested in marking its difference from the 
erstwhile colonial rulers, the most effective means of acquiring indigenous land, i.e., the actual 
elimination of the people, was a political impossibility. The coloniser’s desire for this forbidden 
possibility leaks into discourses of governance as a readiness to grieve, lament or speculate on the 
inevitability of the Jarawas and the Onges ‘dying out’. However, for the purposes of furthering the 
project of development, the administrators of the Andaman Islands had to find mechanisms of 
extending control over indigenous land that would preserved indigenous life, but on the coloniser’s 
terms. The various policies authored by India’s independent government towards the aboriginal 
tribes of Andaman Islands, including befriending ‘hostile’ tribes, containing them in reserves, 
decreasing the territory of ‘dying’ tribes and resettling ‘tamed’ ones can be read as positive aspects 
of a settler-colonial logic of elimination as they were designed to undermine indigenous life in the 
interest of colonisation. Once located within this history, it is possible to read the Andaman and 
Nicobar Protection of Aboriginal Tribes Regulation (henceforth, ANPATR), promulgated in 1956, 
as the legal framework for the settler-colonial management of indigenous life in the Andaman 
Islands.  
A Framework for Subjugation: Limits and Possibilities of Aboriginal Protection   
In June 1956, the President of India promulgated the Andaman and Nicobar Islands Protection of 
Aboriginal Tribes Regulations (ANPATR). This act empowered the Chief Commissioner of the 
Islands to declare specific areas inhabited by aboriginal tribes as reserved for tribal use alone. It 
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also conferred added responsibilities of preventing alienation of tribal land and controlling or 
stopping the incursion of ‘non-tribals’ into notified tribal territory.72 The Chief Commissioner was 
quick to act upon his new-found authority and notified specific areas of the Andaman and Nicobar 
group of Islands as areas reserved for tribal groups on 2nd April 1957.73 (See Map 1) Received 
wisdom reads the promulgation of the ANPATR positively, arguing that ‘the regulation guaranteed 
the protection of tribal culture by law’74 and recognised large tracts of land as ‘exclusive tribal 
territory’.75 This is an overtly optimistic reading that takes the regulation at face value. It ignores 
the immediate context of agricultural colonisation that informed the government’s understanding 
of tribal territory. Moreover, the actual text of the regulation and the manner of its subsequent 
mobilisation suggests that far from offering substantive protection to aboriginal tribes, this 
regulation laid down the legal framework for their subjugation and dispossession. In this sense, 
the protection of aboriginal tribes in the Andamans needs to be located within the long history of 
exclusion of ‘primitive’ tribes and the ‘backward tribal areas’ from all forms of self-government 
in colonial India that found an afterlife in independent India in special provisions made for 
‘schedule areas’.76 Through a contextualised reading of the ANPATR and its mobilisations in the 
Andaman Islands between 1956 and 1979, I will suggest that this act of legal protection was 
designed to turn tribes perceived as primitive and lawless into subjects of law and not right-bearing 
citizens.  
                                                          
72 Regulation No: 76/56, promulgated by the President of India under clause (2) of article 243 of 
the Constitution, published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section I, 14 May 1956, 
as cited Sekhsaria and Pandya (eds.), Jarawa Dossier, 2010, p. 86. 
73 Sekhsaria and Pandya (eds.), Jarawa Dossier, 2010, p. 88. 
74 Pandya, ‘In Terra Nullius’, p. 22. 
75 Manish Chandi, ‘Colonization and conflict resolution in the Andaman Islands: learning from 
reconstruction of conflict between indigenous and non-indigenous islanders’, in Sekhsaria and 
Pandya (eds.), Jarawa Dossier, 2010, p. 13.  
76 See Schedule V and VI of the Constitution of India.  
27 
 
By 1956, when the Government of India promulgated the Andaman and Nicobar Protection of 
Aboriginal Tribes Regulation, colonisation of the Andaman Islands using settlers from the 
mainland was well underway. The protection offered by the government was not in response to 
any particular demands by the affected tribes or civil society activists, who have played a crucial 
role in framing government policy towards the Jarawas in more recent years.77 This unilateral 
‘protection’ offered to aboriginal tribes, though antithetical to the local context of rapid and 
expanding colonisation, made sense in the contemporary national context of the territorial re-
organisation of the Indian Union effected through the State Reorganisation Act of 1956. As a 
result, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands was reclassified as a Union Territory. At this moment of 
territorial stock-taking and administrative reform, the Andaman Islands was already divided into 
settled areas, where the state had a presence and forested regions, perceived to be occupied or 
inhabited by ‘hostile’ or merely ‘primitive’ aboriginals. The forests, though frequented by 
employees of the Forest Department for extraction of timber, had no permanent presence of the 
state. Even the tramlines used for extraction were ‘pulled up immediately’ after extraction in a 
particular region was completed.78 Therefore, the notification of certain areas as tribal reserves by 
the Chief Commissioner of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in 1957, acknowledged the situation 
on the ground. Marking the limits of ‘tribal territory’ did not involve any consultation with the 
tribes in question regarding their historical patterns of land use and inhabitation. The regulation 
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merely gave legal form to existing frontiers of settlements and colonisation, which were 
maintained through violent policing.   
This is particularly true of the Jarawa Tribal Reserve in Middle and South Andamans. These areas 
had emerged as zones of containment of the ‘hostile’ Jarawas before the notification was issued. 
Its frontiers were marked by bush police camps designed to protect settlers. These settlements and 
therefore, the frontiers of tribal land were of very recent provenance, owing their origins to the 
Government of India’s schemes to settle refugees in ‘empty’ lands in the Andaman Islands. Take 
for example the Tirur region in South Andamans, which was settled between 1949 and 1952.79 
Here, the borders of the cultivated fields blend into the hills, assumed to be Jarawa territory. The 
villages here enjoyed the protection of four bush police camps, which demarcated ‘their’ territory 
from that of the settlers.80 The first five-year plan for settlement of displaced persons from eastern 
Pakistan in the Andamans was inaugurated in 1952. Along with the establishment of new villages 
in Middle Andamans, it also recommended the establishment of a bush police force of forty five 
men to prevent attacks from Jarawas.81 The new villages of Kalsi, Santanu and Uttara, established 
in the Rangat and Kadamtala regions of Middle Andamans between 1952 and 1956, effectively 
marked the intrusion of settled agriculture into forested regions. (See Map 2) How far these forests 
were ‘empty’, i.e., uninhabited by the Jarawas before settlement is questionable, especially since 
after settlement, an expanding force of bush policemen was necessary to keep the Jarawas at bay. 
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By 1957, a string of 14 Bush Police posts with 140 men was maintained along the eastern border 
of Jarawa territory to prevent Jarawa incursion into the colonisation area.82 
In administrative parlance, these regions became territories ‘frequented’ by the Jarawas, but were 
paradoxically, never described as regions occupied or inhabited by them. When the refugees settled 
on these lands narrate their role as pioneers, they are often less circumspect about the consequences 
of their presence for the Jarawas. ‘There were no settlements here,’ said Shukharanjan Mridha, a 
settler of Kalsi when interviewed in 2007. ‘The entirety, the jungle was theirs….Now, the 
settlement was built in their areas, we were brought over and settled’.83 This violent and recent 
history of refugee resettlement and indigenous displacement required regularisation, and the 
ANPATR provided the legal framework for it. On 2nd April 1957, when the Chief Commissioner 
declared particular areas of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to be ‘reserved’ areas, it undoubtedly 
generated ‘a discourse of power, obedience and authority’ through unilateral imposition of a 
bounded territory on the indigenous communities.84 But more importantly, he was also using law, 
as a technology of rule, to legalise the recent and violent history of marginalisation of the Jarawas. 
Seen in its proper context, the ANPATR is a legal manifestation of the settler-colonial dynamic 
that moulds the post-colonial history of the Andaman Islands.  
A closer analysis of the text of ANPATR supports this reading of it as a colonising tool and its 
mobilisation as acts of ‘lawfare’, i.e., an assault on indigenous life conducted through the language 
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and idiom of law.85 The eleven clauses of the ANPATR deal with issues of occupation or 
ownership of tribal land and its management. This included legal limitations on sale and transfer 
of land, on non-tribal ownership or use of tribal land and limitations set on the presence and 
commercial activities of non-aboriginals within the reserve areas. There was no mention 
whatsoever of the need to preserve tribal culture or autonomy. Neither did it recognise any kind of 
indigenous title or autonomous right to land. Instead, what this regulation achieved was to extend 
the absolute sovereignty of the Indian state over every aspect of the delineation and management 
of land occupied by tribes in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The Chief Commissioner was 
empowered to not only notify the limits of the tribal reserve, but also to revise it, as and when he 
saw fit, without consultation or appeal. Similarly, clause four of the Act that disallowed the 
allotment of reserved land for agricultural purposes to anyone who was not a member of an 
aboriginal tribe came with a caveat that empowered the Chief Commissioner to make an exception 
to this rule. He merely needed to be satisfied that the land was ‘not required’ by aboriginals, or, if 
in his opinion, such allotment was ‘in the public interest’.86  The sale of reserved land to non-
aboriginals was forbidden, unless sanctioned by the Chief Commissioner, as was mobility or 
commercial activities by non-tribal people within the reserve areas, unless explicitly permitted. 
These sanctions and permissions, rather than being granted in exceptional situations, became 
routine acts of governance. By April 1957, the Andaman and Nicobar Administration had created 
specific rules and procedures by which settlers could apply for passes to enter the reserve areas 
and obtain licences for trading in specific products, such as coconuts and betel nuts. The rates of 
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exchange were fixed, as were the fees to be collected.87 Moreover, an amendment enacted in 1960 
exempted all government servants ‘while proceeding on duty to a reserved area’ from applying for 
a pass to enter the reserves.88 While this can be seen as a measure to reduce unnecessary 
bureaucracy, the same amendment inexplicably also exempted every single family member of such 
government servants from applying for a pass. ‘Family’ was defined in the widest possible terms, 
to include not just children and spouse, but also parents and brothers and sisters. This effectively 
created the conditions for the abuse of power by ground level employees, especially forest workers 
and bush policemen, and their family members. As the few permitted outsiders within the tribal 
reserves, they had a unique opportunity to exploit the land and the people for profit. Thus, 
conditions conducive for poaching, for illegal expansion of settlements into tribal areas, and for 
the infamous Jarawa ‘safaris,’ where tourists gawk at, photograph or film and throw food at the 
near-naked Jarawas, were the unintended consequences of the ANPATR.89 It is significant that a 
disproportionately large number of illegal ‘encroachments’ into the Jarawa Tribal Reserve are 
authored by Ranchiwallas or labourers recruited from Oraon, Munda and Kharia tribes of the 
Chotonagpur region, who are brought over by the Forest Department or the Department of Public 
Works on short term contracts.90 Equally significant is the fact that in a recent video that exposed 
the crudeness of the Jarawa safaris to the world, the voice commanding Jarawa girls to dance in 
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exchange for food belonged to a man variously identified as belonging to the local police or the 
Indian army, i.e., a government employee.91  
The ANPATR provided no mechanism for the Jarawa or the Onge to exercise any kind of political 
or economic right. In this sense, it continued the colonial legal framework of offering protection 
in lieu of self-representation to those designated as ‘tribes’ in India.92 This protection took the form 
of a series of legal interventions, beginning with the Scheduled Districts Act of 1874 and extending 
right up to the Government of India Act of 1935, which created and maintained a different idiom 
of rule for the tribal areas, variously classified as ‘non-regulation tracts’, ‘scheduled districts’, 
‘backward areas’ and ‘excluded areas’.93 At the core of these regulations was the assertion that 
tribal inhabitants of these areas were too backward or primitive to be capable of political self-
representation and vulnerable to exploitation by surrounding caste Hindus. Its main impact was to 
perpetuate direct colonial rule and bar all forms of representative politics in tribal areas in the name 
of ‘protection’. The Constitution of India, through its fifth and sixth schedules, re-affirmed this 
legal pluralism that denied full political agency to tribes.  Scheduled and tribal areas were created 
as special zones of legal exceptionalism within the states of India. For example, Article 244 (1) of 
the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution of India, which dealt with the administration of tribal areas 
in all of India excepting the North East, enabled the Governor of a particular state to limit the sway 
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of existing laws, or impose specially designed regulations as he saw fit, on the scheduled area 
within his jurisdiction.94 The ANPATR extended to the Andaman Islands this practice of 
promoting tribal welfare and protection through neo-colonial benevolent despotism. In the 
Andamans, it fell upon the Chief Commissioner to don the mantle of the benevolent despot. 
However, unlike the rest of India, where the Governor was obliged to consult with a Tribes 
Advisory Council,95 in the Andaman Islands the Chief Commissioner could legislate on tribal 
welfare unfettered by any obligation to consult, or even inform, the aboriginal tribes. Given the 
dominant impetus to promote settler-led development of the Andaman Islands, it should come as 
no surprise that the alterations effected by the Chief Commissioner of the tribal reserves evoking 
ANPATR were, in all but one instance, summary reductions of reserved areas to accommodate 
new settlements.  
In 1959, the eastern boundary of the Jarawa Tribal Reserve in the Middle Andamans was adjusted 
through a notification which basically empowered the Forest Department to determine where the 
new ‘imaginary line’ should fall. The language of the notification suggests that this gave the Forest 
Department a carte blanche to eat into the Jarawa reserve, provided ‘sufficient land’ was ‘left’ to 
‘provide enough hunting ground to Jarawas while they are on the move’. The needs of the Jarawas 
were however to be balanced out against ‘the suitability of such alignment, from the point of view 
of water and terrain, as a patrol path’.96  In the 1970s, there was a spate of notifications modifying 
the boundaries of the tribal reserves. In 1972, a significant area on the eastern coast of Little 
Andaman Island was carved out of the reserve areas97 and Rutland Island was de-notified in 1973.98 
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In 1979, the entire section of the Jarawa Tribal Reserve lying to the east of the newly constructed 
Andaman Trunk Road in the South Andaman Island, which had been built right through the tribal 
reserve area, was de-notified.99 Each of these adjustments were post-facto legalisations of 
encroachment into tribal areas that were part and parcel of the plans of ‘accelerated development’ 
of the Andaman Islands, envisioned in 1965, and implemented by the very authorities responsible 
for the ‘protection’ of the indigenous population of the Andaman Islands.   
Herein lies the paradox of the ‘protection’ offered to the aboriginal tribes of the Andaman Islands 
by the Government of India. It created a series of special powers, routine functions and roles for 
outsiders who were designated as protectors. Given that local administrators had little or no 
knowledge of the Jarawa language, the Jarawas were most certainly not informed of the terms of 
their own protection, such as the boundaries of the Jarawa Tribal Reserve.100 Condescension 
towards tribal culture was rampant within administrative circles in India during the 1950s, when 
public debates around policy for the welfare of tribes reiterated colonial stereotypes of 
backwardness. It is unsurprising that protectors steeped in such prejudice could, and did, turn into 
exploiters. However, to focus on the ‘degenerate notions about the indigenous tribes in the 
Andamans’ amongst ‘continually changing administrators’,101 is to miss the structural causes 
behind the marginalization of the indigenous people of the Andaman Islands. There was an organic 
link between laws offering so-called protection to tribes and the construction of tribes as 
backwards people incapable of self-determination. The ANPATR, far from ensuring tribal 
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autonomy, illustrates the bankruptcy of legal protectionism. In the Andaman Islands, it provided 
the legal framework of tribal dispossession.  
Conclusion  
This article maps the history of the Indian state’s management of indigeneity in the Andaman 
Islands, with a particular focus on the immediate aftermath of independence. Received wisdom on 
the Andamans has long suggested that the encounter between the colonial state and indigenous 
communities in these Islands constitutes a significant departure from the general pattern of 
governance of tribes in mainland India.102 The scholarship on tribes in colonial India explores the 
wide variety in the nature of internal organisation of tribes in India, and their long and history of 
interaction with larger polities and economies.103 This made for a complex and variable encounter 
with colonial modernity. However, undergriding this diversity is a consensus regarding the 
absence of settler colonialism in the Indian context. This consensus feeds a related claim, put 
forward both by the Indian state and some anthropologists, of the inapplicability of the concept of 
indigenous rights to the Indian context.104 Kaushik Ghosh makes the link between the absence of 
settler colonialism and the denial of indigeneity explicit when he argues for two kinds of 
indigeneity. According to Ghosh, ‘indigeneity in the post-colony’ functions through the 
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recognition of ethnicity as opposed to a recognition of priority,105 which, according to him, is a 
defining feature of indigeneity in settler colonies.106 The unresolved debate over the applicability 
of the concept of indigeneity in India is to a large extent prompted by the recent global movement 
for the rights of indigenous people that has been enthusiastically embraced by tribal activists in 
India.107 However, in the Andaman Islands, it is important to use the term indigenous to distinguish 
the old inhabitants of these Islands from later settlers from mainland India, which included recruits 
from tribal communities. Moreover, the evocation of settler colonialism to understand the history 
of the Andaman Islands does not derive from current debates regarding the applicability of 
indigeneity in the Indian context. Historians have drawn upon the pattern of racialisation of the 
Andamanese Islanders and the construction of the Islands as an imperial frontier to argue that the 
penal colony of the Andaman Islands was also a settler colony.108 In a recent multidisciplinary 
attempt to author an integrated history of seemingly diverse, yet co-constitutive framings of the 
Andaman Islands- as an imperial outpost, a penal colony and a post-colonial site for settlement 
and development- the Islands are frequently described as a settler colony.109 There is thus a broad 
consensus that the history of the Andaman Islands constitutes a clear divergence from the general 
                                                          
105 For an exploration of the specific form of liberal governance that seeks to govern the ‘prior’ 
see Elizabeth A. Povinelli, 'The Governance of the Prior,' Interventions, 13:1 (2011): 13–30.  
106 Kaushik Ghosh, ‘Indigenous Incitements’, in Kapoor, Dip and Edward Shizha (eds). Indigenous 
knowledge and learning in Asia and Africa: Essentialism, Continuity and Change, (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010) 
107 For details see Bengt G. Karlsson, ‘Anthropology and the ‘Indigenous Slot’. 
108 See Sen, Savagery and Colonialism in the Indian Ocean, (2010) and Vaidik, Imperial 
Andamans, (2010). 
109 Clare Anderson, Madhumita Mazumdar, and Vishvajit Pandya, New Histories of the 
Andaman Islands:  Landscape, Place and Identity in the Bay of Bengal, 1790–2012, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2015).  
 
37 
 
pattern of governance of tribal areas in colonial India, where large-scale and state-led agricultural 
settlement was never an option.  
This consensus regarding the exceptional status of the Andaman Islands as a settler colony raises 
more questions than it answers. Within existing scholarship, the legal and governmental apparatus 
that enabled and justified settler colonialism in the Andaman Islands is left largely unexplained. 
This article addresses this lacuna by demonstrating how the discursive framing of the Andaman 
Islands as empty land and the de facto operation of a logic of terra nullius enabled the occupation 
of the islands and provided justification for establishing settlements. The concept of de facto terra 
nullius is useful in understanding instances of state-led appropriation of tribal land that is enabled 
by an implicit denial of indigenous land rights or ownership. This process is distinct from an 
explicit denial of property rights to any particular tribe or community within legal jurisprudence. 
It operates through a refusal to recognise indigeneity/aboriginality or name even the possibility of 
tribal/aboriginal ownership of land. Thus, such acts of colonisation will invariably fail the test of 
explicit legal evocation. Instead of law, de facto terra nullius manifests itself in the sphere of 
governance. Its operation can be traced in the actual appropriation of land for state-led settlement 
that happens without recourse to purchase or conquest. It relies on the conjoined discourses of 
emptiness and primitivism to naturalise such appropriations and erase the violence it involves. To 
evoke de facto terra nullius is to therefore do the critical work of making the naturalised and 
therefore invisible violence of settlement visible.  
As illustrated by the history of the Andaman Islands, de facto terra nullius does not necessarily 
lead to large-scale settler colonialism. In colonial Andamans, settlement remained limited to 
piecemeal schemes, dictated by the needs of the penal colony of Port Blair. The colonial 
administrators had neither the political will, nor the resources for large-scale agrarian colonisation. 
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The postcolonial ambition of eradicating ‘backwardness’ from the national geography 
dramatically increased the resources allotted to the project of developing the Andaman Islands. 
However, the fact that national development took the form of state-led agrarian settlement of 
‘empty’ land using settlers from mainland India, cannot be explained without the colonial legacy 
of de facto terra nullius. The discourse of national development could unleash an extreme form of 
settler colonialism upon the Andaman Islands because it was already imagined in terms of multiple 
lacks. Herein lies the significance of the specific history of the Andaman Islands. It illustrates how 
post-colonial development can take the form of settler colonialism within an avowedly nationalist 
context.110 De facto terra nullius is a particularly valuable concept in attempting to understand this 
dynamic. It is an inherently contradictory concept as on one hand, it is constituted by colonial 
discourses around primitivism. On the other hand, it refuses to explicitly acknowledge indigeneity 
and the radical alterity between the settler and the colonised. This distinguishes it from the legal 
fiction of terra nullius, which relies on the explicit evocation of racial difference between the 
settler and the native, where the native is seen as inherently incapable of conceptualizing or 
exercising ownership over land. By contrast, de facto terra nullius, given its refusal to 
acknowledge indigenous difference in law, is perfectly compatible with the discourses of ‘self-
rule’ that avoids racialized categories of difference.  
The first two decades of independence in the Andaman Islands reveals how the governance of 
indigeneity in postcolonial Andamans displayed both continuities and radical departures from 
colonial practices. The marginalisation of the Andamanese Islanders during the colonial period 
                                                          
110 For a critical discussion on how notions of development can lend themselves to practices of 
genocide, see Vinay Lal, “The Concentration Camp and Development: the Pasts and Future of 
Genocide”, Patterns of Prejudice 39:2, (2005). 220-243. 
 
39 
 
derived from the complete denial of indigenous rights. The postcolonial period ushered in an era 
of official recognition of the indigenous population of the Islands, albeit in ways that purposefully 
prioritised notions of backwardness and primitivism over any notion of rights. The Andamanese 
Islanders were recognised as ‘aboriginals’ when they were promised a legal regime of 
protectionism in 1956, under the Andaman and Nicobar Protection of Aboriginal Tribes 
Regulation. This recognition was unilaterally offered by the post-colonial state and not prompted 
by any demand articulated by the indigenous communities. The legal recognition of aboriginality 
was effectively a colonising move. On one hand, it denied ‘primitive tribes’ political agency, while 
on the other hand it normalised absolute and unilateral state control over the limits of their territory.  
The ‘protection’ offered to the indigenous population of the Andaman Islands, through an 
elaborate series of regulations which included the creation of reserve areas, was actually designed 
to rationalise and enable settler-colonialism. Unlike the colonial era, in post-colonial Andaman 
Islands settler colonialism functioned through a sly politics of recognition that deliberately focused 
on the primitive nature of the indigenous population, while studiously ignoring the question of 
rights that might derive from prior habitation. This particular relationship between colonisation 
and recognition echoes Povinelli’s critique of the limits of liberal recognition in promoting 
indigenous rights or welfare.111 It is crucial for understanding the limits and possibilities of the 
contemporary debates around the welfare and survival of Jarawas in the Andaman Islands. Once 
placed in a historical context, the current activist focus on ensuring the sanctity of the Jarawa Tribal 
Reserve and ensuring minimal contact between the Jarawas and outsiders can be read as advocating 
the continuation of a settler-colonial governmentality peculiar to the post-colonial state.  
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The specific history of postcolonial development in the Andaman Islands also interrogates the 
conventional binary between the settler colony and the post-colony, and India’s location within 
the latter category. These Islands were not unique within the emerging geography of 
underdevelopment in independent India. They were merely the first of several regions classified 
as ‘backwards’ and in need of ‘accelerated development’, during the fourth plan period.112 The 
history of this nation-wide project of interventionist development is yet to be written. Given that 
the Government of India also re-classified tribes with declining population and pre-agricultural 
technology as ‘Primitive Tribal Groups’ immediately after, during the fifth plan period, it is likely 
that the imagined geographies of ‘backwardness’ and ‘primitivism’ overlapped. Discomfort with 
a category of governance that marked specific groups as primitive began to the expressed in the 
nineties.113 But it was not until 2006 that this category was replaced by the more palatable 
‘Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Group’ or PVTG. In other words, the exigencies of planned 
development in India simultaneously marked some areas as ‘backward’ and some people as 
‘primitive’. Given how the conjuncture of discourses of tribal backwardness and state-led 
development unleashed settler colonialism in the Andaman Islands, an exploration of the 
governance regions where the presence of ‘primitive tribes’ coincided with economic 
backwardness might well call into question received wisdom on the nature of state-society 
relationship in India, assumed to be qualitatively different from that in settler colonies.  
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